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We propose that fund performance is predicted by its R2, obtained by regressing its return 
on the Fama-French-Carhart four benchmark portfolios.   Lower R2, or higher 
idiosyncratic risk relative to total risk, measures selectivity or active management. We 
show that lagged R2 has significant negative predictive coefficient in predicting alpha or 
Information Ratio.  This is consistent with Cremers and Petajisto’s (2008) results on the 
effect of selectivity.  Funds ranked into lagged lowest-quintile R2 and highest-quintile 
alpha produce significant alpha of 2.8%.  Also, both fund RMSE and return volatility 
predict the following year’s performance with significant positive and negative 
coefficients, respectively.  Across funds, R2 is an increasing function of fund size and a 
decreasing function of its age, its manager tenure and its past performance, but better 
performance induces funds to subsequently increase their R2. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Fama (1972) suggests that a portfolio’s overall performance in excess of the beta-
adjusted return on a benchmark (or naïve) portfolio is due to selectivity, which “measures 
how well the chosen portfolio did relative to a naively selected portfolio with the same 
level of risk” (Fama, 1972, p. 557). Recent studies show that fund performance is 
positively affected by fund selectivity or active management, measured by the deviation 
of funds holdings from some diversified benchmark portfolio (see review below).  The 
problem is that this measure of selectivity requires knowledge of the portfolio 
composition of all mutual funds and of their benchmark indexes, which is hard for many 
investors to obtain and calculate.  It also hard to measure selectivity when the benchmark 
portfolio is not well-defines, that is, when funds opt to outperform some combination of 
benchmark indexes. 
We propose a simple and intuitive measure of mutual fund selectivity: the fund’s R2 
from the standard four-factor regression model of Fama-French (1993) and Carhart’s 
(1997), which includes four factor-mimicking portfolios: RM-Rf (the market portfolio 
excess return), SMB (small minus big size stocks), HML (high minus low book-to-market 
ratio stocks) and UMD (winner minus loser stocks).  R2, the proportion of the return 
variance that is explained by broad portfolios or indexes, is a traditional measure of 
diversification, and thus 1-R2 measures the weight of idiosyncratic risk or selectivity.  
The closer is R2 to 1, the closer does the fund track the benchmark portfolios and the 
lower the selectivity.  If selectivity enhances mutual fund performance, R2 should 
negatively predict the fund’s performance. 
This is indeed what we find: R2 has a negative and significant predictive effect on 
fund performance, using two conventional measures: the intercept alpha from the Fama-
French-Carhart four-factor regression model, and the Information Ratio, which is alpha 
scaled by the idiosyncratic (regression residual) risk.  We also identify an R2-based 
strategy that earns significantly positive average excess return (factor-adjusted):  at the 
beginning of each year, select funds whose lagged R2 is in the lowest quintile and whose 
alpha is in the highest quintile. These funds generate a significant alpha of 2.81%.  
Our results are robust to the indexes used. A recent study by Cremers, Petajisto and 
Zitzewitz (2008) criticizes the use of Fama-French (1993) indexes SMB and the HML in 
evaluating mutual fund performance.  We re-do our analysis using instead the returns on the 
six Fama-French portfolios (2x3) classified by size (small and big) and value, neutral or 
growth, in addition to the market excess return and Carhart’s UMD.  Our results remain 
unchanged: R2 has negative and highly significant predictive effect on the following year’s 
alpha and Information Ratio. 
R2 is also lower due to another aspect of active fund management: rotation between 
characteristics or factors over time, which may reflect timing.  We estimate yearly four-
factor regressions with fixed factor coefficients, while active fund managers change their 
portfolio such that it rotates between factors.  Mamaysky, Spiegel and Zhang (2007) 
estimate funds’ factor betas over five-year periods by Kalman Filter and find that the 
coefficients vary over time.  Our estimation period is only one year, during which factor 
rotation is more limited, but such rotation can still be done to some extent, resulting in 
lower estimated R2. 
R2 is decreasing in the regression RMSE (root mean squared error) and increasing in 
the standard deviation of the fund return, denoted by SDR (their squared ratio equals 
1-R2).  The RMSE is related to the “tracking error” in studies of active fund management. 
Wermers (2003) finds that the standard deviation of S&P500-adjusted fund return is 
positively related to the contemporaneous fund performance, measured by alpha from the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  Cremers and Petajisto (2008) find that the tracking 
error (the standard deviation of the fund’s benchmark-adjusted returns) has insignificant 
predictive effect on performance.  However, studies of the effect of tracking error on 
performance often omit from the estimation model the SDR, which correlates positively 
with the tracking error.  Such omitted-variable specification may result in a biased 
estimation of the effect of tracking error on performance.  We include both RMSE and 
SDR in the regression and find that RMSE has a positive and significant predictive effect 
on fund performance while SDR has negative and significant predictive effect on fund 
performance.  Together, these effects are consistent with the effect of R2.  
Recent studies of hedge fund performance use R2 as a measure of fund strategy and 
find similar results: lower R2 predicts better fund performance. Titman and Tiu (2008) 
conclude that hedge fund performance is better when they do less hedging against 
common benchmarks, using Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2004) benchmark indices, and 
suggest that choosing smaller exposure to factor risk reflects hedge funds managers’ 
confidence in their ability.  Wang and Zheng (2008) define 1-R2 as the “hedge fund 
distinctiveness index,” where R2 is obtained from a regression of the hedge fund return on 
the return on its hedge fund style index, or on the aggregate hedge fund index, or on the 
Fung and Hsieh (2001) 7-factor model.  
Fund selectivity is shown to enhance performance. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and 
Wermers (1997) analyze selectivity at the securities level, finding that securities that are 
picked by mutual funds outperform a characteristic-based benchmark, although the gain 
from stock picking approximately equals the funds’ average management fee.  Other 
studies examine selectivity at the fund level.   Brand, Brown and Gallagher (2005) 
measure a fund active management by a divergence index, defined as the sum of squared 
deviations of the fund portfolio’s stock weights from the market portfolio (or portfolio’s 
deviations from the benchmark with respect to holdings the industry and sector level), 
using Australian data. They find that the divergence index positively predicts fund 
performance.  Cremers and Petajisto (2008) show that Active Share, which represents the 
share of portfolio holdings that differ from the fund’s benchmark index holdings, 
significantly predicts fund performance, after controlling for other fund characteristics.  
And, sorting funds on prior one-year performance and on Active Share, they identify a 
group of funds with active share and high prior performance that generates significantly 
positive four-factor alpha, after controlling for benchmark (or style) returns.  Notably, 
these returns are net of expenses.   Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) find that funds 
exhibit better performance if they have greater industry concentration of holdings 
compared to the weights of these industries in a diversified portfolio, and Kacperczyk and 
Seru (2007) find that funds whose stocks holdings are related to company-specific 
information from analysts’ expectations exhibit better performance.   
Our study examines the effect of fund selectivity on performance, using measures 
which do not require knowledge of the fund portfolio holdings. We proceed as follows. 
Section 2 presents the fund performance measures that we use and their estimation 
procedure, and then it presents the performance predictors that we use, R2 and its 
components, the residual mean-squared error and the return standard deviation. Section 3 
describes data and sample selection procedure. Section 4 presents the results on the 
prediction of next-year fund performance, employing two performance measures – alpha 
and InfRatio – and various predictive methods.  We also explain why the predictive 
power of our measures is weaker in early period and stronger in more recent periods.  In 
Section 5 we show how using information about past fund performance and R2 enables to 
choose a portfolio of funds which produces significant positive performance in the 
following year. In Section 6 we present estimation of the association between fund 
characteristics and our performance predictor R2. Concluding remarks are in Section 7.  
 
 
2. Performance measures and performance predictors 
 
2.1. Performance measures 
We employ two standard measures of fund performance.  The first is the intercept alphaj 
from the four-factor regression model of Fama and French (1997) and Carhart (1997), 
 
Rej,t = alphaj + β1j(RMt -rf,t) + β2jSMBt + β3jHMLt + β4jUMDt + ej,t .    (1) 
 
Rej,t = Rj,t – rf,t  is the excess return on fund j in period t in excess of the risk-free rate, the 
four factors are defined above and ej,t is the residual.  (In Section 4.8 below we present 
results using an alternative set of indexes.) 
The second performance measure is the Information Ratio or the Appraisal Ratio, 
which measures the extent of the fund’s excess performance relative to its idiosyncratic 
risk. 





 .        (2) 
RMSEj is the squared root of the mean squared errors or residuals ej,t from (1).  Treynor 
and Black (1973), who introduce the Appraisal Ratio in the context of the single-index 
(CAPM) model, show that considering an asset j as part of an optimal portfolio, the 
fraction of the investor’s capital devoted to the jth asset is proportional to the InfRatio.  If 
evaluate a mutual fund as an active investment component in an efficient portfolio rather 
than a sole repository of the investor’s wealth, Bodie, Kane and Markus (2009, pp. 262-
263) show that the larger is the InfRatio of a fund, the greater is the demand for the fund.  
Following Treynor and Black (1973) they show that an optimally constructed risky 
portfolio P, composed of a passive index portfolio M and an active investment portfolio 





alphaSRSR += , 
where alphaA and RMSEA are measured with respect to the passive index M. Thus, the 
contribution of mutual fund A to the Sharpe ratio of the investor’s portfolio is increasing 
in the fund’s Information Ratio. This means that a higher fund’s InfRatio makes the fund 
more attractive to investors. The fund’s Information Ratio has been used as a 
performance measure by Brands, Brown and Gallagher (2005) and by Kacperczyk, Sialm 
and Zheng (2005). 
The use of Information Ratio also helps mitigate the survivorship bias in studies 
of persistence in mutual funds performance. Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross 
(1992) note that choosing a risky strategy may result in high alpha but it also increases 
the probability of failure.  Because we observe the survivors, the apparent pattern is that 
of persistence of high performance and ex post, superior alphas are positively related to 
idiosyncratic risk.  Therefore, scaling alpha by the fund idiosyncratic risk reduces the 
survivorship bias.1 The Information Ratio, which scales the abnormal fund performance 
by the volatility of the abnormal fund returns, mitigates this bias. 
In what follows, we estimate for each fund both alpha and InfRatio and analyze 
how these performance measures can be predicted by various fund characteristics.  
 
2.2 Performance predictors 
We predict fund performance in one period by its estimated R2 in the preceding 
period, where R2 is estimated from the regression model (1).  As detailed below, because 
we use daily data and because some stocks that constitute the fund returns are slow to 
adjust to information, we use in practice the regression model (1) where the fund return is 
                                                 
1 Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) show that the magnitude of the survivorship bias in the calculation of 
average stock returns is an increasing function of the return volatility. 
regressed on the current and one-lag returns of the benchmark indexes (following Dimson 
(1979)).  We also use as predictors the two components of R2 (in squared-root values):  
RMSE, the root mean squared errors from (1), and SDR, the standard deviation of the 
excess fund return Re.   
 
 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
 
We use the CRSP Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database with the 
CDA/Spectrum holdings database and merge the two databases using Mutual Fund Links 
tables available at CRSP. The monthly returns for mutual funds are from the CRSP 
Mutual Fund Database from 1989 to 2007. These are net returns, i.e. after fees, expenses, 
and brokerage commissions but before any front-end or back-end loads. The daily returns 
from 1989 to 1998 are obtained from the International Center for Finance at Yale School 
of Management.2 These data include Standard and Poor’s database of live mutual funds.3 
The S&P data are not survivorship-bias free. They are supplemented by another daily 
database which is used by Goetzmann, Ivkovic, and Rouwenhorst (2001) and obtained 
from the Wall Street Web. This combined database is survivorship-bias free and is also 
used by Cremers and Petajisto (2008). CRSP data on daily mutual fund returns begins in 
March, 1998. Therefore, from 1999 to 2007 we use the CRSP daily data.  Altogether, our 
final sample spans the period from January 1989 to December 2007. 
The CRSP database also contains data on total net assets, the fund’s turnover ratio, 
expense ratio, investment objective, and other fund characteristics. We use the end-of-
year values of these variables. We also use Cremers and Petajisto (2008) Active Share 
measure, for which data are available only for funds reporting share holdings on 
CDA/Spectrum. The criteria for fund selection with Active Share estimated are the same 
as in Cremers and Petajisto (2008).4 
The CRSP database identifies each shareclass separately, whereas the CDA database 
lists only the underlying funds. The Mutual Fund Links tables assign each shareclass to 
                                                 
2 We are grateful to William Goetzmann for providing these data.  
3 This is also previously known as Micropal mutual fund data 
4 We are grateful to Martijn Cremers and Antti Petajisto for providing the Active Share data which are 
available from 1980 to 2006.  
the underlying fund. Whenever a fund has multiple shareclasses at the CRSP database, 
we compute the weighted CRSP net returns, expenses, turnover ratio and other 
characteristics for each fund. The weight is based on the most recent total net assets of 
that shareclass.  
Our analysis employs actively managed all-equity funds.  Included are funds with 
investment objective codes from Weisenberg and Lipper to be aggressive growth, 
growth, growth and income, equity income, growth with current income, income, long-
term growth, maximum capital gains, small capitalization growth, micro-cap, mid-cap, 
unclassified or missing. When both the Weisenberg and the Lipper codes are missing, we 
use Strategic Insight Objective Code to identify the style, and if Weisenberg, Lipper and 
Strategic Insight Objective Code are missing, we use investment objective codes from 
Spectrum, if available, to identify the style. If no code is available for a fund-year and a 
fund has a past year with the style identified, that fund-year is assigned the style of the 
previously identified style-year. If the fund style cannot be identified, it is not included in 
the sample.5  We classify funds into four style categories which roughly follow the 
categorizations in Brown and Goetzmann (1997): (i) “Growth” which includes: 
Aggressive growth, Growth, Long-term growth, Maximum capital gains, (ii) “Income”, 
(iii) “Growth and Income”, (iv) “Small cap” which includes: small cap, small-cap 
growth, micro-cap, mid-cap. We eliminate index funds by deleting those whose name 
includes the word “index” or the abbreviation “ind”.   Following Elton, Gruber and Blake 
(1996), we eliminate funds with total net assets of less than $15 million at the end of the 
year preceding the test year because inclusion of such funds can cause survivorship bias 
in estimation due to reporting conventions. Addressing Evans’s (2004) comment on 
incubation bias, we eliminate observations before the reported starting year by CRSP.  
And, following Cremers and Petajisto (2008), we delete funds with missing name in 
CRSP. We require funds to have at least 125 daily return data in the first year of two 
consecutive years, which we use to estimate lagged values of R2, return variances and 
alpha, and only 50 daily return data in the second year, where we estimate the fund 
                                                 
5 In case that Wiesenberger and Lipper Code are missing, in which case we use another style identifier, we 
check if the fund name corresponds to the style. If it does not, we consider the style as un-identified. There 
are about 5% of fund-years with missing styles. 
performance measures alpha and InfRatio,6 thus reducing the survivorship bias problem. 
We also require funds to have data in the first year on expenses, turnover, total net assets, 
age and managerial tenure.  
For the funds that satisfy these requirements, we estimate their R2 from the 
regression model (1) for the first year of the two-year pair, using the indexes’ current and 
one-lag returns, following Dimson (1979). We rank all resulting R2 estimates and 
symmetrically trim the top and bottom 1% of the observations. The funds with R2 close to 
1.0 are effectively “closet indexers,” and very low R2 may reflect outlier-type strategy or 
estimation error.  We thus obtain a final sample of 16,646 fund-year pairs of 2,314 funds 
with R2 ranging between 0.240 and 0.989. This is the sample that we analyze. The mean 
R2 is 0.86 and the median is 0.90.   Finally, we apply to R2 a logistic transformation, 
TR2 = log[√R2/(1- √R2)].   
The resulting distribution of TR2 is more symmetric than that of R2.  As an alternative to 
R2 in prediction performance we use its components: RMSE, the root mean squared 
errors, and SDR, the fund return’s standard deviation. 
The control variables in the predictive cross-fund regression are those that commonly 
appear in studies of fund performance. For example, Cremers and Petajisto (2008) use 
Total Net Assets, TNA, ($mm), Expenses, the expense ratio of the most recently 
completed fiscal year,7 Turnover, defined as the minimum of aggregated sales or 
aggregated purchases of securities divided by the average 12-month TNA of the fund. 
Other fund characteristics are Age, computed as the difference in years between current 
date and the date the fund was first offered, and Manager Tenure in logarithm, the 
difference in years between the current date and the date when the current manager took 
control. An important predictor of future performance is lagged alpha or InfRatio which 
may reflect managerial skill and strategy and is shown to be a significant predictor of 
future performance (see Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Gruber (1996)). 
INSERT TABLE I 
                                                 
6 Cremers and Petajisto (2008) require 125 days in the performance estimation year (the second of the two-
year pair). Our results do not materially change under this requirement. 
7 Expense ratio is the ratio of total investment that shareholders pay for the fund's operating expenses, 
which include 12b-1 fees. Expense ratio may include waivers and reimbursements, causing it to appear to 
be less then the fund management fee.  
Table I presents the statistics of our sample.  Panel A presents fund characteristics, 
while Panel B presents the correlations between them.  We observe that R2 is larger for 
large funds, which cannot be niche investors and must hold a broad portfolio, which 
makes their performance closer to that of broad indexes. Funds with more idiosyncratic 
investment – being more active – have higher expense ratio, as evident from the negative 
correlation between R2 and Expenses. A detailed analysis of the relationship between R2 
and the other control variables is presented in Table X. 
 
4. Fund Performance prediction in cross-sectional regressions 
We study the relationship between fund performance and lagged R2 by regressing the 
fund annualized alpha from Model (1) and InfRatio (Information Ratio) defined in (2) on 
the fund’s previous-year TR2 (logistic transformation of R2) and control variables.  All 
fund characteristics that are used to predict performance are known at the end of year y-1 
while performance is measured over the following year y.  
 
4.1. Fund alpha as a measure of performance 
We expect alpha to be a negative function of the fund’s R2. Table II presents the 
results of a regression of alpha on TR2 or on its components RMSE and SDR, the root 
mean squared errors from regression (1) and the standard deviation of the fund excess 
return Ret. We estimate the performance over the 18 years, 1990-2007 (the first year for 
parameter estimation is 1989) in a pooled regression with year dummy variables and four 
style dummy variables. Errors are clustered at the fund level. 
INSERT TABLE II 
The estimation results in Table II, column (1) show that R2 is a strong predictor of 
alpha. The coefficient of TR2 is –0.680 with t = 7.69.  This means that funds with low R2, 
which may be more active in pursuing stock selection strategies, perform better.  R2 is 
decreasing in RMSE and increasing in SDR.  In column (2) we estimate the effect of these 
components of R2 on alpha.  The coefficient of RMSE is 3.955 (t = 6.33) and the 
coefficient of SDR is –6.688 (t = 19.28).  This pair of results is consistent with the results 
on the negative effect of R2.  Our result on the significant positive effect of RMSE should 
be compared to the mixed results on its effect obtained in previous studies that use RMSE 
as a measure of “tracking error,” a proxy for fund active management or selectivity.  
These studies omit the total fund risk SDR which is positively correlated with RMSE and 
itself has negative coefficient in the performance equation.  The correlation between 
RMSE and SDR in our sample is 0.686.  The omission of SDR produces a downward bias 
in the coefficient of RMSE, hence the mixed results on its effect. 
The effect of fund size (TNA) on performance is negative, although this negative 
effect is mitigated for very large funds, as evident from the positive and significant 
coefficient of log(TNA)2. Expenses negatively affect performance, as observed by Gruber 
(1996).  Given that R2 is negatively correlated with Expenses (see Table I, Panel B), we 
re-estimate the model excluding the variable Expenses.  The coefficient of TR2 changes 
very little, remaining negative and highly significant.  The effect of Manager Tenure (in 
logarithm) is negative, meaning that managers who are longer time on the job generate 
worse performance. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. We revisit the 
effect of this variable later in this paper. 
 Our result on the superior performance of funds with higher R2 is consistent with the 
findings of Cremers and Petajisto (2008) on better performance of funds with active 
management, measured by AS (Active Share), the sum of absolute deviations of the 
fund’s stock holdings (weights) from those of its benchmark portfolio. We replicate their 
result in column (3): AS has a positive coefficient, 1.579, with t = 3.01.  The sample 
decreases to 1,890 funds because the calculation of AS requires fund portfolio holdings 
data, and their sample ends in 2006.  When including both TR2 and AS in the regression 
(column 4), TR2 retains its negative and highly significant effect while the coefficient of 
AS becomes insignificant (with negative sign). Similarly, the effects of RMSE and SDR 
remain practically unchanged when AS is included in the model (column 5), while the 
coefficient of AS switches to become negative and marginally insignificant.  Notably, 
however, Cremers and Petajisto (2008) measure the performance of their Active Shares 
measure relative to a specific fund’s benchmark portfolio, not relative to alpha from the 
Fama-French-Carhart’s multi-factor model. 
In the rest of the table, we split the sample into two equal nine year subperiods. The 
year 1999, which begins the second subperiod, coincides with the beginning year of 
CRSP data. The first nine-year subperiod (1990-1998) has ¼ of the sample fund years 
while the second subperiod (1999-2007) that utilizes CRSP data has ¾ of the sample fund 
years. In the first subperiod, TR2 is insignificant and also RMSE is insignificant, while 
SDR retains its negative and significant effect. We explain the weak performance of TR2 
during the first nine-year period in Section 4.3 below. In the recent nine-year subperiod 
that includes most of the data, TR2 has a negative and highly significant effect on alpha, 
and the pair RMSE and SDR have the expected signs – positive and negative, respectively 
– with high statistical significance.  The results obtained for the whole sample hold 
stronger for the last nine years of the sample.  
 
4.2. Information Ratio as a measure of performance 
The second performance measure is the fund’s Information Ratio, InfRatioj = 
alphaj/RMSEj. Theoretically, the demand for an additional asset by an investor who holds 
an efficient portfolio is an increasing function of the asset’s InfRatio.  Also, Brown, 
Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) discuss the merit of dividing alpha by RMSE as a 
way to mitigate the survivorship bias.  We estimate whether InfRatio is affected by the 
fund’s lagged TR2 or its RMSE and SDR, controlling for other fund characteristics. 
INSERT TABLE III HERE 
The results in Table III show that TR2 has negative and highly significant effect on 
the following year fund’s InfRatio.  RMSE and SDR also predict fund performance with 
positive and negative coefficients, respectively, which are highly significant.  As before, 
the effect is stronger in the second subperiod than it is in the first. For TR2, its negative 
effect here in the first subperiod is more significant than it is in Table II, first period. 
Active Share, AS, is a positive and highly significant predictor of InfRatio for the 
whole sample (column (3)) and it remains so after including in the model either TR2 or 
RMSE and SDR.  However, its coefficient changes signs between the two subperiods, 
being negative in the first.  Overall, TR2 consistently predicts the fund Information Ratio 
for the whole sample and for the two subperiods, and after controlling for other fund 
characteristics as well as for Active Share.  The effects of fund Expenses and size (TNA) 
are similar to that in the alpha model.  
 
4.3. Why is the predictive power of R2 stronger in recent years than in early years?  
 
Our results show that during the first nine years of the sample (Period 1), the 
coefficient of TR2j,y-1 as predictor of αj,y is negative but small and insignificant, while in 
the second nine-year period (Period 2), the coefficient TR2j,y-1  is more negative and 
statistically it is highly significant.  Notably, there is a big difference in the sample size 
and data source between the two periods. Period 1 has 3,999 fund years while Period 2 
has 12,647 fund years, more than three-fold. The data source for Period 2 is CRSP, which 
provides broader data.  In addition, we propose the following explanation. 
We want to measure the relationship between the fund performance (αj,y) in year y 
and the fund’s strategy for that year, the planned R2j,y, using R2j,y-1 as an estimate of the 
planned R2j,y. This follows, for example, the convention in asset pricing empirical test 
procedures such as that of Fama and MacBeth (1973) who use lagged portfolio β as an 
instrument for current β.  But if R2j,y-1 is a poor predictor of planned R2j,y, this procedure 
produces poor results on the relationship between performance and planned R2j,y. 
Indeed, we observe that in Period 1, Corr(TR2j,y, TR2j,y-1) is far lower than in 
Period 2, and therefore in Period 1, TR2j,y does a poor job predicting αj,y.  We do an 
annual regression   
TR2j,y = b0,y + b1,y TR2j,y-1 + ej,y 
for y = 1990, 1991, … 2007 and obtain the following results for the R-sqr from these 
regressions:  
Period 1, 1990-1998: Average R-sqr = 0.24.  Median R-sqr = 0.28. 
Period 2, 1999-2007: Average R-sqr = 0.62.  Median R-sqr = 0.70. 
This means that in Period 2, R2j,y-1 is a more reliable (less noisy) estimate of the 
fund’s next year’s R2j,y.  This partly accounts for lagged R2j,y-1 being a stronger predictor 
of year-y performance in Period 2, as seen in Tables II and III. 
We further do the following regression for the entire 18-year period. Define 
PERIOD2 = 1 for the years 1999-2007. Then,8 
 
                                                 
8 The t-statistics in the regressions below employ heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 
(1980)), clustered by funds. 
TR2j,y =  0.524 TR2j,y-1 + 0.227 PERIOD2*TR2j,y-1 + year fixed effects 
   (23.73)   (9.94) 
 
The positive and significant coefficient of PERIOD2*TR2j,y-1 means that during 
Period 2, R2j is greatly more persistent between the years compared to the persistence in 
Period 1.  We also estimate the model as panel regression with fund fixed effects:  
  
TR2j,y = 0.178 TR2j,y-1  + 0.136 PERIOD2*TR12j,y-1   + year fixed effects  
   (7.67)     (5.73)   + fund fixed effects 
 
This shows again a large increase in persistence over time of funds’ R2j in Period 2 than it 




4.4. Fund Fixed Effects 
Table IV presents estimations with fund fixed effects, which effectively remove inter-
fund differences that relate to fixed fund characteristics that could account for the 
negative performance-TR2 relationship.  Here, the hurdle is raised because if a fund has a 
constant strategy that results in low R2, its performance will be captured by its fixed 
effect and will not show as a function of its R2.  
INSERT TABLE IV 
The estimation results with fund fixed effect show that TR2 significantly predicts fund 
performance, measured either by alpha or by InfRatio. Higher TR2 predicts lower 
performance in the following year, after controlling for fund characteristics, both those 
that are fixed and those that vary over time. RMSE and SDR too are significant predictors 
of fund performance.  In this regression, Expenses is insignificant because it changes very 
little for a given fund. The results also show that as the fund becomes larger, its 
performance deteriorates. The coefficient of Log(TNA) is negative and significant, but 
this effect is attenuated as the fund becomes very large, as evident from the positive and 
significant coefficient on Log(TNA)2.  The coefficient of lagged alpha is positive and 
significant while that of lagged InfRatio is insignificantly different from zero.  The latter 
result is greatly different from that in Table III, where the coefficient of lagged InfRatio is 
positive and highly significant. The two results can, however, be reconciled.  Across 
funds, we do not control for the unobserved fund strategy, which differs across funds and 
may be persistent for each fund.  Therefore, the noisy estimate of the quality of the fund’s 
strategy, i.e., its lagged performance, positively predicts the fund’s future performance.  
However, for given fund characteristics (controlled by the fund fixed effects), the 
performance should hover around the mean, and therefore the coefficient on lagged 
performance should be around zero, as it is for lagged InfRatio.  The positive coefficient 
of lagged alpha means that a fund with better performance keeps improving it, and an 
underperforming fund keeps deteriorating. These results, however, are somewhat 
changed when we change the benchmark portfolios used; see section 4.8 below. 
We estimate the effect of Active Share in a fixed-effect regression without TR2 and 
obtain that its coefficient in the alpha regression is negative and significant. When adding 
Active Share to the alpha regression that includes TR2, its coefficient is again negative 
and significant, while TR2 retains its negative and significant coefficient. When adding 
Active Share to the alpha regression that includes RMSE and SDR, its effect is negative 
and significant, while the results for RMSE and SDR are qualitatively unaltered.  In the 
InfRatio equations, Active Share has positive but statistically insignificant coefficient in 
the fixed-effect regressions. 
 
 
 4.5. Annual cross-sectional regressions (Fama-MacBeth procedure) 
We now estimate the predictive power of TR2 and the pair RMSE and SDR by the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure, performing annual cross-sectional estimates which 
allow the slope coefficients of the explanatory variables to vary over time.  The control 
variables are the same as in the previous regression, including the style dummy variables. 
INSERT TABLE V 
The results in Table V are consistent with the previous results although they are not 
always as statistically significant.  TR2 has a negative predictive effect on alpha and its 
average coefficient is significant at the 6% level.  The lower statistical significance may 
be due to the fact that in this procedure, all years have the same weight regardless of the 
number of funds in each, while in the pooled panel regression, the estimation results are 
largely influenced by the number of observations (fund-years) in recent years which is 
much greater than in earlier years, and it is in recent years that the negative alpha-TR2 is 
more significant. Still, in a binomial test for the coefficient of TR2 being negative against 
the null that it is equally-likely to be positive or negative, the null is rejected at the 0.05 
level.  Another feature of this procedure that may account for the results is the coefficient 
of all control variables are allowed to vary between years. In this estimation, only the 
coefficients of Expenses and lagged alpha are statistically significant.  
Measuring fund performance by InfRatio, the coefficient of TR2 is negative and 
significant at the 0.01 level.  The binomial test too rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient of TR2 is equally likely to be positive or negative in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that the coefficient of TR2 is negative. 
RMSE and SDR have the expected signs – positive and negative, respectively – in 
both the alpha model and in the model of InfRatio. However, their coefficients are 
statistically significant only in the InfRatio regression.   
 
 
4.6. Testing for nonlinearity in the predictive effects of R2 and of past performance 
(above and below median). 
We now examine non-linearity in the predictive performance of both R2 and alpha 
or InfRatio.  In the first year of each two-year pair we divide R2 into those above and 
below the median for the year.  The dummy variable HiDUMR2 = 1 if R2 is above the 
median for the year. Then we split TR2 into HiTR2= HiDUMR2*TR2 and its complement 
LoTR2=(1- HiDUMR2)*TR2. We follow the same procedure with alpha, splitting it in 
each year above\below the median into Hialpha and Loalpha, with the related dummy 
variable HiDUMalpha, and with InfRatio, creating the variables HiDUMInfRatio, 
HiInfRatio and LoInfRatio.   We then estimate the models that we have estimated before, 
replacing TR2 and alpha (or InfRatio) by the respective three variables which allow for 
different intercept and different slope coefficients for values above and below the 
median.   
INSERT TABLE VI 
 The results in column (1) of Table VI show that in the alpha equation, the effects 
of both TR2y-1 and alphay-1 on alphay are non-linear, with their above-median values 
having weaker predictive effects (in absolute term) than their below-median values.  The 
coefficient of HiTR2, while negative and significant, is less negative than the coefficient 
of LoTR2, and the coefficient of Hialpha is less positive than the coefficient of Loalpha.  
The overall median of R2y-1 is 0.90 and its maximum is 0.989, leaving smaller variance in 
its above-median values (note, however, that the transformation into TR2 increases the 
variance of above-median values).  The below-median values of R2y-1 range from 0.24 to 
0.90, and it is for this range that there is a more negative predictive effect of TR2y-1 on 
alphay.  As for lagged alpha, Loalphay-1 has much stronger predictive power on alphay 
than does Hialphay-1, implying greater persistence of bad performance, a pattern noted by 
Gruber (1996) who predicts alpha by the rank of lagged alpha. 
 However, in the InfRatio model, column (4), there are no asymmetric effects. The 
coefficients of HiTR2 and LoTR2 are very similar, both being negative and significant. 
Nor is there asymmetry in the effects of HiInfRatio and LoInfRatio, both having positive 
and significant coefficients which are almost the same.  Weighting alpha by RMSE, 
which produces InfRatio, seems to eliminate the asymmetry in performance prediction. 
 
 
4.7. Interaction effects of R2 with alpha and Manager Tenure 
We examine the interaction predictive effect of TR2 with alpha and with managerial 
tenure in column (2).  The question is whether the effect of selectivity or idiosyncrasy 
employed by funds depends on their past performance. The pattern of the mean alpha 
when funds are sorted by their lagged R2 and alpha (Panel A in Tables VIII and IX 
below) suggests that among the weakly-performing funds, lower R2 predicts worse alpha.  
We therefore include in the model the interaction term alphay-1*TR2 or InfRatio*TR2.  
Another hypothesis relates to the connection between manager tenure and fund 
strategy. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) propose that a fund manager’s propensity to take 
unsystematic risk is positively related to her age, which we translate here to managerial 
tenure. We therefore add to the model the interaction term Log(Manager Tenure)*TR2. 
The estimated effects of these two interaction terms are presented in column (2) for 
the alpha model and in column (5) for the InfRatio model. The results are: 
(a) The coefficients of alpha*TR2 and of InfRatio*TR2 are negative and 
significant, meaning that that the negative effect of TR2y-1 on performance is 
stronger for funds that have been performing better in the past year. If 
managerial skill is positively related to track record of performance (lagged 
alpha), the results mean that selectivity (low R2) is more valuable if applied by 
more skillful managers.  
(b) The coefficients of Log(Manager Tenure)*TR2 are positive and significant, 
meaning that the positive effect of selectivity (low TR2y-1) on performance is 
stronger in funds with newer managers.  The coefficient of Log(Manager 
Tenure) in itself is negative and significant as opposed to being insignificant 
in Tables II and III, implying a detrimental effect of longevity in the fund on 
performance.  It seems that for a longer-tenure manager, whose performance is 
worse, it is better to follow the indexes (have higher R2).  
Notably, in both these equations, the negative effect of TR2 is negative and highly 
significant. 
Finally, columns (3) and (6) combine the models of the non-linear effects of TR2 
and alpha or InfRatio with the two interaction effects. The results remain qualitatively the 
same as for each model separately. Focusing on the effect of TR2, it remains negative and 
highly significant for both above and below median values, with its effect being 
attenuated for funds with longer-tenure managers and funds with bad past performance.  
 
 
4.8. Robustness check: using different benchmark indexes 
Our analysis employs the conventional Fama-French benchmark portfolios, which 
are supposed to mimic unobserved factors.  The use of these portfolios in performance 
evaluation of mutual funds is criticized by Cremers, Petajisto and Zitzewitz (2008) who 
point out that the small-minus-big portfolio gives equal weight to both its components 
while the market value of the “small” portfolio is far smaller than the market value of 
“big.”  Similarly, the value-minus-growth portfolio gives equal weights to both while the 
market value of the former greatly exceeds that of the latter.  Also, the benchmark 
portfolios small-minus-big and high-minus-low book/market involve holding short 
positions in major portfolios which funds cannot do.  Finally, a fund’s beta coefficients 
on the SMB portfolio, for example, constrain the fund’s beta on small and big stock 
portfolios to be the very same in absolute value (but with opposite signs). 
 We reexamine our results using as benchmarks the Fama-French six long-only 
portfolios which cover most of the market and are thus feasible benchmarks for mutual 
funds.  The six (2x3) portfolios are based on sorting by size (two groups) into big and 
small stocks and by book-to-market (three groups) into value, neutral and growth stocks.  
The average return of each portfolio is value weighted.  Then, the betas of a mutual fund 
on these portfolios reflect the loading of the characteristics of each of these portfolios 
unto the fund returns, as opposed to being constrained in the traditional benchmarks.    
 We replicate our analysis by regressing the fund’s daily returns on the following 
eight benchmark return series:  The excess return (over the risk-free rate) of the market 
and of the six Fama-French portfolios, and the Carhart momentum portfolio. We repeat 
our procedure: We estimate each fund’s R2, RMSE, SDR and alpha, and proceed by 
regressing the fund’s alpha or InfRatio on the previous year’s R2 (transformed into TR2) 
or on the pair RMSE and SDR, adding control variables (fund characteristics) and lagged 
performance.  The estimation of R2 being based on eight instead of four indexes, the 
mean R2 is slightly higher, 0.87 compared to 0.86 before. The sample selection criteria 
are similar to those before. 
INSERT TABLE VII 
 Table VII shows that our results are robust to the change in the benchmark 
portfolios.  The table includes cross-section regressions (with year and style dummy 
variables) and a panel estimation with fund fixed effect.  The predictive coefficients of 
TR2 in the alpha model (column (1)) and in the InfRatio model (Column (3)) are negative 
and highly significant, as they were in Tables II and III, respectively. Similarly, the 
coefficients of the pair RMSE and SDR are positive and negative, respectively, and both 
are highly significant. 
 The fund fixed-effect regressions too are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Table IV. The coefficient of TR2 is negative and significant, meaning that a decline in the 
fund R2 – or greater idiosyncrasy in investment – improves performance, measured by 
either alpha or InfRatio, after controlling for inter-fund differences.  Similarly, the 
coefficient of RMSE is positive and that of SDR is negative, both being highly significant.  
The difference in results from the previous analysis pertains to the coefficients of lagged 
performance.  In Table IV, the coefficient of lagged alpha is positive and significant and 
that of lagged InfRatio is insignificantly different from zero. Here, the coefficient of 
lagged alpha is insignificant while the coefficient of lagged InfRatio is negative and 
significant, implying reversal in performance over time.   
Notably, the coefficients of lagged performance differ from those in the cross 
section. They are positive in the cross-section regressions and zero or negative in the 
fixed-effects regressions.  The cross-section results mean that better performing funds are 
more likely to continue to outperform. This may reflect the effect of an unobserved fund 
characteristic, such as the fund’s investment strategy, for which the fund’s past 
performance is a noisy proxy. Once we control for the fund characteristics (including its 
strategy) by the fund fixed effects, we obtain that better performance in one year does not 
predict better performance in the following year, or it even shows a reversal in 
performance (when using InfRatio).  This means that a fund strategy produces some 
average level of performance which is reverted to over time. 
Finally, follow the recommendation of Cremers, Petajisto and Zitzewitz (2008) 
and use the following benchmark portfolios:  the excess return on the market, midcap 
index, small cap index, three value factors (large, mid and small) and the momentum 
factor. We use these benchmark portfolios to estimate alpha and R2 and then we estimate 
a panel regression model of alphaj,y on TR2j,y-1 and the other control variables that appear 
in our analysis.  The resulting coefficient of TR2j,y-1 is –0.736 with t = 7.44. Again, our 
predictive measure R2 is robust to the set of benchmark used to evaluate performance. 
 
 
5.  Fund performance based on sorting on lagged R2 and lagged performance 
We identify a group of funds which generate significant positive performance. In 
each year y we sort funds into five portfolios by their R2 in y-1 and within each quintile 
we sort the funds into five portfolios by their alpha (or InfRatio) in y-1. Then, we 
estimate the average year-y alpha (or InfRatio) for all funds that are included in each of 
the 25 portfolios. 
INSERT TABLE VIII 
Panel A of Table VIII reports the average portfolio alpha and Panel B reports the 
average portfolio InfRatio.  In Panel A, average alphay increases in alphay-1 and decreases 
in R2y-1, as in the regressions.  The lowest R2y-1-highest alphay-1 portfolio produces annual 
alpha of 2.81% with t = 5.84, and the lowest R2y-1-next to highest alphay-1 portfolio had 
average alpha of 1.05% with t = 2.91.   Also, among the highest alphay-1 portfolios, the 
average alpha on the lowest R2 portfolio exceeds the average alpha on the highest R2 
portfolio by 3.62% (t = 6.96).  The difference in the mean alpha between low and high R2 
quintile portfolios is positive for the four highest quintile portfolios of alpha, with the 
difference being significant for the top three alpha quintiles.  However, in the bottom-
performing funds, measured by low alphay-1, low R2y-1 predicts worse rather than better 
performance.  Perhaps in such funds, low R2 does not indicate selectivity but rather 
unreasonable idiosyncratic bets. 
The results for InfRatio as a performance measure are qualitatively similar. 
Performance is decreasing in R2y-1 and it increases with InfRatioy-1. The portfolio of funds 
with the highest InfRatioy-1 and lowest R2y-1 has a positive InfRatioy, 0.02, with t = 6.16.  
Here, unlike the case of the alpha-sorted funds, the average InfRatioy is monotonically 
and significantly decreasing in R2y-1 for all five InfRatioy-1 quintile portfolios, even for the 
worst-performing funds by InfRatioy-1. 
INSERT TABLE IX HERE 
We repeat the above analysis doing independent sorting on R2y-1 and on alphay-1. The 
results, presented in Table IX, Panel A, are qualitatively the same.  There are two low-
R2y-1 portfolios, with the forth and fifth highest alphay-1, that have positive and significant 
alphay. In particular, the portfolio of the lowest R2y-1 and highest alphay-1 has average 
alphay of 2.235% with t = 6.21.  For the four higher quintile portfolios of alphay-1, the 
average alpha of the lowest R2y-1 portfolio is significantly higher than that of the highest 
R2y-1 portfolio. The results for InfRatio (Panel B) are qualitatively similar, with the 
average performance of low-R2 portfolios being higher than that of the high-R2 portfolios 
for all five InfRatioy-1 quintiles. The fund portfolio of the highest-InfRatioy-1 and lowest 
R2y-1 has average InfRatioy of 0.016 with t = 6.03. 
 
 
6.  Factors related to funds’ R2 
We suggest that a fund chooses a strategy, such as the extent of selectivity that we 
measure by R2, which subsequently affects its performance. We now examine whether 
there are systematic fund characteristics that are associated with the fund’s R2 by 
regressing TR2 on lagged fund characteristics. 
INSERT TABLE X HERE 
The results in Table X show that the funds with high expenses have lower R2, as 
evident from the negative and significant coefficient of Expenses in model (1).   While 
Expenses is lagged, it is quite persistent so the estimated relationship suggests persistent 
fund policy on expenses and strategy regarding selectivity.  More actively-managed funds 
expend more resources on selectivity and thus incur higher expenses, and at the same 
time investors are willing to pay more for investing in these funds because of their 
superior performance. In the fixed-effect regression (model (2)), the coefficient of 
Expenses is practically zero reflecting almost no change over time in the expense ratio 
that is related to R2.  The positive coefficient of Log(TNA) in both models means that 
larger funds hold broader and more diversified portfolio, which increases their R2. As the 
fund size increases, so does its R2.  Another explanation is due to Koijen’s (2008) model 
of fund managers who derive utility from improving their ranking or status by raising 
their fund size.  He proposes that managers of smaller fund that have room to grow and 
provide better status have an incentive to “deviate from the pack” and employ active 
investment strategy.  Here, it means that smaller fund employ less benchmark-based 
policy and more idiosyncratic policy, producing a positive relationship between TNA and 
R2. This relationship is weaker as the fund size grows, following the negative coefficient 
of Log(TNA)2 (significant only in Model (1)).  
Older funds (higher Age) have lower R2 after controlling for other characteristics, 
including fund size which usually grows with fund age.  This result suggests that one 
reason for fund longevity is its greater selectivity (lower R2) which produces better 
performance.  There is negative relationship between R2 and Managerial Tenure, which 
is consistent with Chevalier and Ellison’s (1999, p. 391) suggestion that younger 
managers tend to herd or “avoid unsystematic risk when selecting their portfolio.”  Here 
it means larger R2 – which is greater proportion of the risk due to systematic risk – for 
managers with lower tenure. 
The effect of past performance (alpha) on fund’s R2 has different sign in the two 
models.  Model (1) mostly reflects the R2-alpha relationship across funds.  Stable and 
persistent strategy and performance by funds produces a negative R2-alpha relationship 
across funds regardless of which variable lags the other.   
The estimated R2-lagged alpha relationship in the fixed-effect Model (2) shows that 
better performing funds tend to reduce their level of selectivity and do more indexing. 
(Notably, we control for fund size that is itself affected by past performance.) Our result 
is consistent with Elton, Gruber and Blake’s (2003, p. 785) proposition that funds adopt 
the following strategies: “Greater risk-taking after a period of underperforming the 
benchmarks,” and “Less risk-taking after periods of outperforming the benchmarks.”  We 
obtain that outperforming funds subsequently increase the extent of indexing, or choose 
higher R2, thus taking less idiosyncratic risk.  This helps preserve their past good 
performance in multi-year performance comparisons, although this strategy is costly: 
higher R2 lowers future performance. And, funds that underperform subsequently take 
more idiosyncratic strategy – choose lower R2 – in the hope of hitting a successful 
strategy.  For such funds, indexing will preserve their past bad performance and will not 
give them a chance to improve. The results on the R2-lagged performance relationship are 
qualitatively similar when using InfRatio instead of alpha, and are not reported here. 
The estimation model of the determinants of R2 includes year dummy variables. The 
coefficients of these variables generally increase over time.  In the first nine years, the 
average R2 is lower than it is in the last nine years, suggesting a growing propensity to 
follow the indexes over time. The last nine-years, which use different data source and 
produce more significant negative relationship between performance and R2, seem to 




We propose an intuitive and convenient measure of mutual fund selectivity or 
active management: the R2 from a regression of fund return on the Fama-French (1993) 
and Carhart (1997) factors.  We find that the fund R2, estimated from one year’s daily 
returns, predicts the following year’s fund performance, measured either by the fund’s 
alpha or by its Information Ratio (InfRatio), which is the fund alpha scaled by the 
regression’s RMSE.  The predictive coefficient of R2 is negative and highly significant. 
That is, lower R2 or greater fund selectivity predicts better performance.  We also obtain 
that the pair of volatility measures which constitute R2, RMSE and return standard 
deviation SDR (their squared ratio equals 1-R2) predict funds’ subsequent performance, 
with positive and negative coefficients, respectively, which are highly significant.  These 
effects are obtained after controlling for commonly-used fund characteristics.  Our results 
are the same in both cross-sectional analysis of funds, with year and style fixed effects, 
and in panel regressions with fund fixed effects in addition to year and style fixed effects. 
Our analysis is shown to be robust to the indexes used. We re-estimate our model 
using eight benchmark portfolios: the excess return on the market, the excess returns on 
the Fama-French six size-by-value\growth portfolios and Carhart’s momentum factors. 
The results are qualitatively unchanged. In particular, R2 has a negative and highly 
significant coefficient in regressions where the dependent variable is the following year’s 
alpha or InfRatio. 
We obtain that the negative predictive effect of R2 is particularly strong for funds 
with better past performance and for funds whose manager’s tenure is shorter. We also 
find that in predicting alpha, the effect of R2 is greater for funds whose R2 is in the lower 
range of its distribution.  In predicting InfRatio, the negative predictive effect of R2 is 
similar in both the high and low range of its distribution across funds. 
 Using our strategy, it is possible to identify a portfolio of funds that produces 
positive and significant performance, measured either by alpha or by its InfRatio.  We 
sort at the end of each year funds by their R2 and by their past alpha and invest in funds 
that are in the bottom quintile of R2 and the highest quintile of alpha.  The resulting 
portfolio has an average annual alpha of 2.81% with t = 5.84.  Similar results are obtained 
when replacing alpha by the InfRatio.  The results are similar for independent sorting of 
funds by their R2 and past performance. 
 Fund R2 is negatively related to another measure of active fund management and 
selectivity developed by Cremers and Petajisto (2008), called Active Share, the sum of 
absolute differences between the portfolio holdings of the fund and its benchmark 
portfolio.  When including Active Shares in the model that predicts performance, the 
predictive effect of R2 remains negative and highly significant.  
R2 is related to identifiable fund characteristics. It is negatively related to 
expenses, fund age and manager tenure, and positively related to fund size.  Importantly, 
funds react to performance by changing their R2. Across funds, funds with better past 
performance also have lower R2. However, in a fund fixed-effect analysis we find that the 
effect of past performance on R2 is positive, meaning that following better performance, 
funds tend to index more to preserve their rank, while worse-performing funds increase 
subsequently their idiosyncratic risk. 
Altogether, this study offers a new convenient way to predict mutual fund 
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Table I. Summary statistics  
Statistics on actively managed equity mutual funds included in our sample. The performance measure 
alpha is the intercept from an annual regression of daily fund excess returns on the factor returns RM-Rf, 
SMB, HML and MOM (momentum), and their lagged values. R2 is obtained from the above regression, and 
TR2 = log(√R2/(1- √R2)). The Total Net Assets (TNA) in $mm, Expenses and Turnover are as of the end of 
the year.  Age is fund age, the number of years since the fund was first offered. Tenure is the tenure of the 
manager, the number of years since the current manager took control. AS is Active Share measure from 
Cremers and Petajisto (2008). The sample period is from 1/1989 to 12/2007.  
Panel A: Fund characteristics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Total number of funds:               2,314 
TNA (total net assets, in $millions) 1,501.65 266.69 15.1 193,453.1 
Age (years) 13.65 8.92 0.7 84.92 
Expenses (%) 1.27 1.23 0.01 4.54 
Turnover (%) 89.38 66.00 0.20 3,603 
Manager Tenure (years) 3.44 2.82 0.08 45.08 
Alpha (%) -0.92 -1.11 -131.04 149.00 
R2 0.86 0.90 0.240 0.989 
TR2 2.88 2.95 -0.026 5.158 
 
Panel B: Correlations (**: 1% significance, *: 5% significance) 
 Log(TNA) Age Expenses Turnover Log(Ma
nager 
Tenure) 
Alpha R2 TR2 
Log(TNA) 1.00        
Age 0.35** 1.00       
Expenses -0.32** -0.23** 1.00      
Turnover -0.12** -0.09** 0.19** 1.00     
Log(Manag
er Tenure)  
0.12** 0.09** -0.06** -0.07** 1.00    
Alpha 0.05** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03** -0.04** 1.00   
R2 0.13** -0.02* -0.10** -0.02* 0.09** -0.07** 1.00  
TR2 0.15** -0.002 -0.13** -0.04** 0.10** -0.09** 0.92** 1.00 
Table II. Predictive regressions of fund performance: Four-factor alpha 
 
Panel regressions of alpha, the intercept from an annual regression of daily fund excess returns on the factor returns RM-Rf, SMB, HML and MOM (momentum) and their 
lagged values. All independent variables are as of the end of the previous year. TR2 = log(√R2/(1- √R2)), where R2 is obtained from the above regression. RMSE is the root 
mean squared error from this regression and SDR is the standard deviation of the daily fund excess returns. The Total Net Assets (TNA) in $mm, Expenses and Turnover 
are as of the end of the year.  Age is fund age, the number of years since the fund was first offered. Tenure is the tenure of the manager, the number of years since the 
current manager took control. AS is Active Share measure from Cremers and Petajisto (2008). Each regression also includes year and style dummy variables. The t-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by fund. The sample period is from 1/1990 to 12/2007.  
1990-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007 Variables 
lagged one year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
TR2 -0.680 
(7.69) 







RMSE  3.955 
(6.33) 






SDR  -6.688 
(19.28) 












































































































































    
N of funds 2,314 2,314 1,890 1,890 1,890 871 871 2,177 2,177 
Fund-years 16,646 16,646 13,204 13,204 13,204 3,999 3,999 12,647 12,647 
R2 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.26 
Table III. Predictive regressions of fund performance: Information Ratio 
 
Panel regressions of the Information Ratio, InfRatio = alpha/RMSE, where alpha is the intercept from an annual regression of daily fund excess returns on the factor 
returns RM-Rf, SMB, HML and MOM (momentum) and their lagged values, and RMSE is the root mean squared error from this regression. TR2 = log(√R2/(1- √R2)), where 
R2 is obtained from the above regression and SDR is the standard deviation of the daily fund excess returns. All independent variables are as of the end of the previous 
year. The Total Net Assets (TNA) in $mm, Expenses and Turnover are as of the end of the year.  Age is fund age, the number of years since the fund was first offered. 
Tenure is the tenure of the manager, the number of years since the current manager took control. AS is Active Share measure from Cremers and Petajisto (2008). Each 
regression also includes year and style dummy variables. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by fund. The sample period is from 1/1990 
to 12/2007.  
1990-2007 1990-1998 1999-2007 Variables 
lagged one year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
TR2 -0.010 
(12.77) 







RMSE  0.051 
(12.05) 






SDR  -0.053 
(21.30) 




















































































































































N of funds 2,314 2,314 1,890 1,890 1,890 727 727 1,812 1,812 
Fund-years 16,646 16,646 13,204 13,204 13,204 3,282 3,282 9,922 9,922 
R-sqr 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.22 
Table IV. Predictive regressions of fund performance:  
Estimation with fund fixed effects in 
 
Panel regressions with fund fixed-effects. The dependent variables are alpha, the intercept from an annual 
regression of daily fund excess returns on the factor returns RM-Rf, SMB, HML and MOM (momentum) and 
their lagged values, and InfRatio = alpha/RMSE, where RMSE is the root mean squared error from this 
regression. ll independent variables are as of the end of the previous year. TR2 = log(√R2/(1- √R2)), where 
R2 is obtained from the above regression. SDR is the standard deviation of the daily fund returns. The Total 
Net Assets (TNA) in $mm, Expenses and Turnover are as of the end of the year.  Age is fund age, the 
number of years since the fund was first offered. Tenure is the tenure of the manager, the number of years 
since the current manager took control. Each regression also includes year and style dummies, and t-




Variables lagged one 
year 







































































N of funds 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 
Fund-years 16,646 16,646 16,646 16,646 
R-sqr 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.20 
Table V. Fama-MacBeth regressions of fund performance 
The dependent variables are alpha, the intercept from an annual regression of daily fund excess 
returns on the factor returns RM-Rf, SMB, HML and MOM (momentum) and their lagged values 
and InfRatio = alpha/RMSE, where RMSE is the root mean squared error from this regression. All 
independent variables are as of the end of the previous year. TR2 = log(√R2/(1- √R2)), where R2 is 
obtained from the above regression. SDR is the standard deviation of the daily fund returns. The 
Total Net Assets (TNA) in $mm, Expenses and Turnover are as of the end of the year.  Age is fund 
age, the number of years since the fund was first offered. Tenure is the tenure of the manager, the 
number of years since the current manager took control. The numbers presented are the means of 
the annual coefficients, the t-statistics (in parentheses) and (in brackets) the probability of the null 
hypothesis being rejected.  At the bottom three lines, the numbers in brackets are the probability 
under null of the coefficient being equally likely positive or negative. The sample period is from 
1/1990 to 12/2007.  
Dependent variable Variables lagged one 










































































































R-sqr 0.214 0.246 0.242 0.259 
TR2: pos/neg  






RMSE: pos/neg  












Table VI: Predictive Regressions of fund performance, with  
(1) high and low split of lagged TR2, alpha and InfRatio and with  
(2) interaction between variables 
Panel regressions of alpha, the intercept from an annual regression of daily fund excess 
returns on the factor returns RM-Rf, SMB, HML and MOM (momentum) and their lagged 
values, and InfRatio = alpha/RMSE. All independent variables are as of the end of the 
previous year. TR2 = log(√R2/(1- √R2)), where R2 is obtained from the above regression. 
The Total Net Assets (TNA) in $mm, Expenses and Turnover are as of the end of the year.  
Age is fund age, the number of years since the fund was first offered. Tenure is the tenure 
of the manager, the number of years since the current manager took control. HiDUMR2 
equals 1 if in year y-1 the fund’s R2 is higher than the cross-sectional median R2 for that 
year (zero otherwise). HiTR2=TR2*HiDUMR2 and LoTR2=TR2*(1-HiDUMR2). The 
dummies specifications for Alpha (Lo/Hi) and InfRatio (Lo/Hi) are defined in a similar 
way. Each regression also includes year and style dummy variables. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by fund. The sample period is from 
1/1990 to 12/2007.  
 
Dependent variable Variables lagged 
one year alpha InfRatio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TR2  -0.898 
(9.55) 















































































































Alpha  0.324 
(7.91) 
    



















   
InfRatio     0.255 
(10.13) 
 
















N of funds 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 
Fund-years 16,646 16,646 16,646 16,646 16,646 16,646 
R2 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Table VII: Predictive regressions of fund performance using different Fama-French-Carhart indexes 
Panel regressions of alpha, the intercept from an annual regression of daily fund excess returns on 8 
factors: the market factor, the Fama-French 6 portfolios classified as 2x3 by size and by book-to-market, 
and Carhart’s momentum factor, and their lagged values. All independent variables are as of the end of the 
previous year. TR2 = log(√R2/(1- √R2)), where R2 is obtained from the above regression. RMSE is the root 
mean squared error from this regression and SDR is the standard deviation of the daily fund returns over the 
year. Information Ratio, InfRatio = alpha/RMSE The Total Net Assets (TNA) in $mm, Expenses and 
Turnover are as of the end of the year.  Age is fund age, the number of years since the fund was first 
offered. Tenure is the tenure of the manager, the number of years since the current manager took control. 
Each regression also includes year and style dummy variables. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by fund. The sample period is from 1/1990 to 12/2007. 
Panel Regression Panel regression with fund fixed effects 
Alpha InfRatio Alpha InfRatio 
Variables lagged 
one year 













































































































































N of funds 2,312 2,312 2,312 2,312 2,312 2,312 2,312 2,312 
Fund-years 16,646 16,646 16,646 16,646 16,646 16,646 16,646 16,646 
R2 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.12 
 
Table VIII. Fund Performance, sorting on R2 and alpha\InfRatio 
The table presents the average portfolio alphas or InfRatio for year y, based on sorting all 
fund-year observations in the sample into quintiles by R2 and within that by alpha or 
InfRatio based on year y-1 estimation. alpha is the intercept from a regression of daily 
fund excess returns on the factor returns RM-Rf, SMB, HML and MOM (momentum) and 
their lagged values. R2 is obtained from this regression. InfRatio is alpha/RMSE from this 
regression. Panel A shows the average annualized alphas with t-statistics in parentheses. 
Panel B presents the results for InfRatio. The sample period is from 1/1990 to 12/2007.  
Panel A. Four-factor alphay 
 R2y-1 
alphay-1 Low 2 3 4 High All Low-High 

































































































Low 2 3 4 High All Low-High 






























































































Table IX. Fund Performance: Independent sorting on R2 and alpha\InfRatio 
The table presents the average portfolio alphas or InfRatio for year y, based on 
independent sorting all fund-year observations in the sample into quintiles by R2 and by 
alpha or InfRatio based on year y-1 estimation. alpha is the intercept from a regression of 
daily fund excess returns on the factor returns RM-Rf, SMB, HML and MOM 
(momentum) and their lagged values. R2 is obtained from this regression. InfRatio is 
alpha/RMSE from this regression. Panel A shows the average annualized alphas with t-
statistics in parentheses. Panel B presents the results for InfRatio. The sample period is 
from 1/1990 to 12/2007.  
Panel A. Four-factor alphay 
R2y-1 
alphay-1 Low 2 3 4 High All Low-High 






























































































Panel B. Four-factor Information Ratioy 
R2y-1 
InfRatioy-1 Low 2 3 4 High All Low-High 





























































































Table X. Determinants of TR2  
Panel regressions of TR2 = log(√R2/(1- √R2)), where R2 is obtained from the an annual regression 
of daily fund excess returns on the factor returns RM-Rf, SMB, HML and MOM (momentum) and 
their lagged values. All independent variables are as of the end of the previous year. The 
performance measure alpha is the intercept from the above regression. The Total Net Assets 
(TNA) in $mm, Expenses and Turnover are as of the end of the year.  Age is fund age, the number 
of years since the fund was first offered. Tenure is the tenure of the manager, the number of years 
since the current manager took control. Each regression also includes style dummy variables and 
year dummy variables. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by 
fund. The sample period is from 1/1990 to 12/2007. 














































N of funds 2,314 2,314 
Fund-years 16,646 16,646 
R-sqr 0.39 0.46 
 
